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Abstract 
Using a rich micro dataset drawn from administrative archives, we explore whether Social 
Security Wealth (SSW) is an important factor affecting the decision to become self-
employed in Italy. We focus on the two main categories of self-employed professions 
covered by the Italian public pension system: craftsmen and shopkeepers. We use the 
large exogenous variation in individual expected SSW that occurred as a result of the 
policy reform process undertaken in Italy during the 1990s to identify the effect of this 
variable and we study how the probability of being self-employed or employed depends, 
amongst other things, on the difference in the expected SSW that accrues under the two 
alternative employment scenarios. Our key finding is that a higher difference in expected 
SSW from self-employment compared to employment has a positive effect on the 
probability of being self-employed and on the probability of switching to self-
employment, while it has a negative effect on the probability of switching from self-
employment to employment. We also study how these effects vary with age and, in 
general, we find that the effect is, in absolute terms, stronger at younger and older ages. 
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1. Introduction 
Small businesses are acknowledged to play an important role in sustaining 
economic growth and employment (OECD, 2014). On this basis, they are often supported 
by governments, through regulations and taxes. Studying the effects of government policy 
instruments on self-employment is thus of some importance.  
In Italy, the self-employment rate has historically been high, mainly due to a high 
percentage of craftsmen and shopkeepers (OECD, 2014). These two groups of self-
employed workers, together with farmers, have benefited from financial support though 
various channels, including the public pension system, which became particularly 
generous after a major reform was implemented in 1990. Problems concerning the 
financial sustainability of the public pension system, however, prompted a series of 
reforms which then greatly reduced the generosity of the benefits for various categories 
of workers, including the self-employed. The effect of the reforms implemented in the 
1990s on expected Social Security Wealth (SSW) has been uneven across generations 
and categories of workers. 
In this work, we explore if Social Security Wealth is an important factor affecting 
the decision to become self-employed in Italy1. Thanks to the exogenous variability 
induced by the reforms, we are able to identify the effect of public pension wealth on the 
probability of being self-employed. We use administrative data, which enables us to 
compute public pension wealth extremely specifically, as the data contains the complete 
work history of a sample of private sector workers covered by the public pension system. 
The vast majority of workers in Italy fall into this category.  
There is a great deal of literature on the determinants of self-employment. Our 
study relates, in particular, to works studying how institutional factors affect self-
employment. Quinn (1980) studies the retirement and labour supply patterns of the self-
employed and employees in response to retirement policies, while Long (1982), Blau 
(1987) and Scheutze (2000) consider the role of taxes. Blanchflower (2000) studies the 
determinants of self-employment trends in OECD countries. Using panel data, Bruce 
(2000) and Hansson (2012) study how the individual decision to transition from 
employment to self-employment depends on average and marginal tax rates. 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007) find that, conditional upon other characteristics, Social 
Security Wealth at age 62 is not significantly related to transitions to self-employment, 
neither for men nor women. Also related to our work, Li et al. (2015) isolate the causal 
effect of wealth on the transition from employment to self-employment and find that an 
                                                 
1 We refer to Social Security Wealth or public pension wealth interchangeably. It is important to 
clarify as early as at this stage that, until recently, the Italian pension system was a single tier type, with 
income from occupational pension schemes representing a very tiny share of individuals’ pension wealth, 
both for employees and for a very large majority of the self-employed.    
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exogenous reduction in pension wealth significantly decreases the probability of 
transitioning from wage-employment to self-employment.  
Our study is based on a large panel of administrative data drawn from the archive 
of the main Italian social security scheme (National Institute of Social Security, Istituto 
Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, INPS). INPS manages the Social Security accounts for 
various categories of private workers, including employees, craftsmen, shopkeepers, 
farmers and other smaller categories. Given the nature of our data, we are able to analyse 
both the self-employment rate, i.e. the probability of an individual being self-employed 
rather than employed, and the probabilities of switching from employment to self-
employment and vice versa. An analysis of the self-employment rate is able to estimate 
the probability of an individual being self-employed rather than an employee in any given 
period, which is the combined probability that a worker switched to self-employment at 
some time and survived until that time period. While this analysis is mainly descriptive, 
it provides a useful illustration of the data and allows for a comparison to be made with 
previous studies analysing the self-employment rate. With the benefit of a long panel 
dataset, we are also able to estimate the transition probabilities, i.e. the probability of a 
wage worker switching to self-employment, and of a self-employed worker switching to 
wage employment. 
We have a large sample size - about 9 million person-year observations - which is 
especially important when studying transition probabilities, since persistency in the same 
pension scheme is extremely high. Moreover, the panel nature of the data allows us to 
control for unobserved determinants of an individual’s self-employment status and its 
dynamics, such as risk aversion.  
We concentrate our analysis on the two main categories of self-employed workers 
covered by INPS - craftsmen and shopkeepers - which share the same Social Security 
rules and can be treated as a single category. We thus study how the probability of being 
(or becoming) self-employed or employed depends, amongst other things, on the 
difference in expected SSW that can be accrued in the two alternative employment 
scenarios, i.e. the difference between the expected SSW for self-employment and the 
expected SSW for wage employment. In other words, we test if Social Security rules 
favourable to the self-employed as opposed to employees encourage self-employment. 
Participation in the public pension system is compulsory and the difference in expected 
SSW reflects the respective convenience of participating in either scheme. Other things 
being equal, a rational worker will choose the sector with the highest expected SSW.  
Our key finding is that the difference in expected SSW does indeed affect both the 
probability of being in self-employment and the probability of switching in or out of self-
employment. In particular, a higher difference in expected SSW from self-employment 
as opposed to employment has a positive effect on the probability of being in self-
employment and on the probability of switching to self-employment, while it has a 
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negative effect on the probability of switching from self-employment to employment. We 
also study how these effects vary with age and, in general, we find that the effect is, in 
absolute terms, stronger at younger and older ages. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2 we review the related 
literature, in section 3 we outline the evolution of Italian pension legislation and in section 
4 we describe our empirical strategy. In section 5 we describe our data set and in section 
6 we present our results when estimating expected Social Security Wealth. In section 7 
we present the results of our econometric analysis based on the pooled sample, while in 
sections 8 and 9 we study transitions from employment to self-employment and vice 
versa. Section 10 concludes the paper. 
 
 2. Related literature 
The literature on self-employment analyses both the factors explaining self-
employment rates and the determinants of the decision to become self-employed. Studies 
focusing on self-employment rates include both time series analysis (Blau, 1987) and 
cross-sectional studies (Scheutze, 2000). This literature typically concentrates on factors 
affecting the evolution of self-employment rates. These include shifts in the composition 
of industries’ employment shares towards industries where self-employment is more 
prevalent, as in the case of service production (Blau, 1997), shifts in the demographic 
composition of the workforce (Crompton, 1993) as well as institutional factors, most 
notably income tax policy (Scheutze, 2000), minimum wage legislation (Blau, 1987) and 
also retirement policies (Quinn, 1980). Self-employment rates have also been found to 
rise with increases in local or national unemployment rates (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1990, Schuetze, 2000, Blanchflower, 2000). More recently, Torrini (2005) studies the role 
of institutional variables in determining self-employment rates across OECD countries. 
In particular, he studies the role of taxation, tax evasion opportunities, product market 
regulation and employment protection legislation.  
The individual decision to become self-employed has also been studied, 
highlighting various factors that may influence such a decision, which may be driven by 
the positive benefits of being self-employed but also by the poor job prospects of wage-
employed or unemployed workers (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998). Evans and Leighton 
(1989) find that workers with previous unemployment spells, lower wage workers and 
workers with a history of job instability are more likely to become self-employed, a result 
consistent with the notion that unsuccessful workers are pushed into self-employment 
(the so-called ‘push’ hypothesis). Self-employed workers are also found to face liquidity 
constraints. Using US micro data, Evans and Leighton (1989) and Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989) find that people with more family assets are likelier to switch from wage-
employment to self-employment. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) find that the 
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probability of self-employment depends positively upon whether the individual has ever 
received an inheritance or gift. Using a quantitative life cycle model with altruism across 
generations and entrepreneurial choice, Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) analyse the role of 
borrowing constraints as determinants of entrepreneurial decisions. Their results indicate 
that voluntary bequests are an important channel allowing some high-ability workers to 
establish or enlarge an entrepreneurial activity. 
Bruce (2000) and Hansson (2012) study how the individual decision to transition 
from wage-employment to self-employment depends on average and marginal tax rates. 
Bruce (2002) analyses transitions from self-employment to wage work. Bruce (2000) 
finds that reducing an individual’s marginal tax rate on self-employment income reduces 
the probability of entry, while reducing his average tax rate increases the probability of 
switching to self-employment. However, this finding is not universal, as, for example, 
Hansson (2012) performs a similar analysis using Swedish panel data, and finds that both 
higher average and marginal taxes have a negative impact on the decision to become self-
employed. Stabile (2004) examines the effects of introducing a payroll tax (the Employer 
Health Tax) into the labour market, which taxes employers, but which exempts the self-
employed. Using a time series of cross-sections of Canadian data, he finds that payroll 
taxes influence the decision to become self-employed, with the probability of self-
employment increasing as taxes on employees increase and vice versa. 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007) use panel data drawn from the US Health and 
Retirement Study to study the determinants of labour force transitions to self-employment 
at older ages. Their analysis controls for a number of factors, including demographic 
characteristics, health status, financial and pension wealth. Conditional upon other 
characteristics, they find that Social Security wealth at age 62 is not significantly related 
to transitions to self-employment, neither for men nor women. Mastrogiacomo and 
Belloni (2015) also look at entrepreneurship choices among older workers and conclude 
that those who shift to self-employment are more motivated employees seeking higher 
job satisfaction. 
The work by Li et al. (2015) is closely related to our study as the authors aim to 
isolate the causal effect of pension wealth on the transition from wage-employment to 
self-employment and, to this end, they use a pension system reform in the Netherlands in 
2006 as an exogenous variation in pension wealth. After the reform, employees born on 
or after 1 January 1950 faced a substantial reduction in their pension wealth. Their main 
empirical results indicate that this exogenous wealth reduction has a significant negative 
effect on the decision to switch to self-employment: the authors highlight that a possible 
explanation for this result is that when pension wealth drops, the wage-employed tend to 
reserve a higher amount of liquid private wealth for retirement and precautionary saving, 
so less liquid financial wealth will be used to start a new business and bear the risk of 
self-employment, resulting in a reduction of transitions to self-employment. 
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Our work also relates to a broader strand of the literature, namely to studies using 
exogenous changes in SSW to evaluate its effect on economic outcomes, such as the 
decision to retire (Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2004, Belloni and Alessie, 2009) or to 
accumulate private wealth through personal savings (Attanasio and Brugiavini, 2003, 
Attanasio and Rohwedder, 2003). Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), in particular, provide 
evidence that saving rates increase as a result of the reduction in pension wealth induced 
by the Italian pension reforms. They also allow for the possibility that substitutability 
changes with age, and find that substitutability is particularly high (and precisely 
estimated) for younger workers. 
 
3. The evolution of the rules in the Italian pension system 
Pension legislation in Italy is still extremely fragmented, even after the reform 
process aimed at harmonising the rules that began back in the nineties, a process that is 
still very much ongoing. The main Social Security institution, INPS (Istituto Nazionale 
della Previdenza Sociale), covers most of the workers in the private sector: the employed, 
craftsmen, shopkeepers and farmers. Among the self-employed, many professionals (e.g. 
lawyers and doctors) are not included because they have independent pension funds, some 
of which have only very recently been incorporated by INPS as part of the harmonisation 
process. We focus on the evolution of the pension rules pertaining to craftsmen and 
shopkeepers, who we label self-employed and who basically share the same rules, and 
privately employed workers.  
In summary, the Italian public pension system is a pay-as-you-go system, with 
different rules, payroll taxes and benefits applying to the self-employed and to employees. 
While, until 1990, the self-employed were entitled to a contribution-based benefit, after 
that year a reform introduced a defined benefit (DB) system, similar to the one already in 
place for employees but with lower payroll taxes. The 1990 reform greatly increased the 
Social Security Wealth of the self-employed while leaving it unaffected for employees.  
Financial sustainability problems, however, prompted a reform in 1992, which 
maintained the DB system but tightened the eligibility criteria and the pension benefit 
rules. While the reform changed the indexation method of the benefits from wages to 
prices for all categories and with immediate effect, the formulae to compute the pension 
benefit differed across generations and pension schemes.  
In 1995, another major reform triggered a transition to a Notional Defined 
Contribution (NDC) scheme for all workers, while maintaining differences in payroll 
taxes. The lengthy transition period planned by the reform, which will last until 2030, 
also implies that its effects are heterogeneous across generations and categories of 
workers.  
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The intended effect of these and other minor reforms that have occurred since 
1992 was to reduce the generosity of the public pension system for all workers: their 
effect on expected Social Security Wealth has, however, been uneven for different 
generations and categories of workers. While we leave a detailed description of the 
evolution of the rules to the Appendix, in section 6 we show the results of our estimation 
of expected SSW for different generations of self-employed and employed workers, 
highlighting how the reforms had heterogeneous effects across different categories of 
workers. 
4. Empirical strategy 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to test the hypothesis that Social Security 
Wealth affects the probability of being self-employed rather than employed, as well as 
the probability of switching from self- to wage-employment and vice versa. As we have 
the benefit of a long panel dataset, we are able to analyse both the self-employment rate 
and the transitions from and to self-employment. An analysis of the self-employment rate 
is able to estimate the probability of an individual being self-employed rather than an 
employee in any given period, which is the combined probability that a worker switched 
to self-employment at some time and survived until that time period. This analysis is 
mainly descriptive, as it does not differentiate the determinants of switching and survival 
into self-employment (Evans and Leighton, 1989), but in addition to providing a useful 
illustration of the data, it allows for a comparison to be made with previous studies of the 
self-employment rate. Having the benefit of a long panel dataset, we are also able to 
estimate the transition probabilities, the probability of a wage worker switching to self-
employment and of a self-employed worker switching to wage-employment. 
In both analyses, of statuses and transitions, we define a dichotomous variable 
selfit+1 equal to 1 if a worker is self-employed in period t+1, and equal to zero if he is an 
employee. With our data, we are able to identify two types of self-employed workers, 
shopkeepers and craftsmen: the Social Security rules are virtually the same across the two 
groups and we treat them as one single group. In addition, we have information on 
employees. For all workers, we observe all the information needed to compute their 
expected public pension as well as the contributions they are expected to pay2. The 
administrative data, however, lacks important information on marital status, family, 
education and so on. For this reason, our estimates are based on a linear probability model, 
which allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant factors, including preferences 
toward risk. Our estimated equation closely follows the work of Bruce (2000, 2002) and 
                                                 
2 While the archive records all spells of work in some schemes, it lacks information on other, 
compulsory, schemes. Most importantly, public sector employees are not covered, like many other 
occupations covered by compulsory private pension schemes (such as lawyers, doctors or journalists, to 
name a few examples). As a consequence, when a worker is not covered by the archive (possibly 
temporarily), we are unable to know if he is having a spell of work in a scheme not covered by INPS or if 
he is out of the labour force. 
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Hansson (2012), who study how variations in tax rates affect the probability of becoming 
self-employed3. 
The estimated equation is of the type: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 = α �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1)� + β𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 (1) 
When we study the self-employment rate, i.e. the probability of being self-
employed rather than employed, the equation is estimated on the pooled sample, while, 
when we focus on the transitions from wage-employment to self-employment and vice 
versa, we select employees (or, alternatively, the self-employed) and follow them until 
they switch.  
In equation (1) we include the difference between the expected SSW in the event 
that a worker decides to be self-employed from time t+1 onwards (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1)) and 
the expected SSW in the event that he decides to be (wage) employed from time t+1 
(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1)). The past career up to time t is taken as given. The expected SSW is 
equal to the present value of benefits expected by the worker minus the payroll tax which 
has to be paid from time t+1 onwards. The income variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1 refers to the individual 
career: the income stream until time t+1, and hence the past income stream, is taken as 
given, and may include both periods in wage-employment and periods in self-
employment. Expected real income from time t+2 onwards is set equal to income at time 
t+1, and it is assumed to be the same both in the case of self-employment and in the case 
of wage-employment4. Thus, the variation in SSW is due to the different rules in place 
for self-employed and wage-employed workers, which is what we wish to capture, rather 
than relating to differences on expected income streams. However, SSW at time t+1 
depends on the expected income stream based on income at time t+1, which is 
endogenous to the decision to be (or to become) self-employed. Analogously to the tax 
literature (in particular, Hansson, 2012), we also compute the expected SSW at time t+1, 
using the rules in force in period t+1, and an income stream constructed on the knowledge 
of income up to time t (which we call (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)), hence assuming real income from time t+1 
onwards is constant and equal to time t income. We also compute this expected SSW in 
the two scenarios, those of self-employment and wage work, and use the difference in 
these two variables as an instrument in equation (1). Alternatively, we also estimate the 
reduced form of (4), plugging in (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) - 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)) as a regressor in place of 
the original SSW variables. 
                                                 
3 Those studies, however, estimate a transition random effect probit and have to take explicit 
account of the correlation between the probability of being included in the sample and the individual 
random effect (resulting in an initial conditions problem). Conversely, our estimation procedure explicitly 
allows for the individual unobserved effect to be correlated with the observables. 
4 In section 6 we provide a more detailed description of the procedure to compute SSW. 
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  The X variables include age dummies and other variables which may explain the 
probability of being (or becoming, depending on the specification) self-employed. In 
particular, we include the present value of real income, which represents the present 
value, valued at time t, of income from work earned throughout the entire working life. 
This income stream is the same used to construct expected SSW and it is assumed to be 
the same in the two scenarios. In particular, to avoid endogeneity issues, income up to 
period t is taken to be the one actually observed for each individual, while from period 
t+1 onwards, it is assumed to be constant in real terms and equal to income in period t. 
This value is meant to capture the overall performance in the labour market, reflecting 
the opportunity cost to become self-employed, or poor employment opportunities. 
Alternatively, however, it may be the case that high income workers have more 
opportunities to be successful when they are self-employed, resulting in a positive 
coefficient.5 
Additionally, we include other variables capturing the labour market performance 
up to period t. Total experience is defined as the number of periods a worker has spent in 
the labour market since entering the labour force. These include working spells as well as 
periods of sick or subsidised unemployment, both as an employee or as a self-employed 
worker. In addition, we include the fraction of time since entering the labour force for the 
first time spent outside the INPS archive, i.e. not working as a covered INPS worker, and 
not having sick or subsidised unemployment spells. Finally, we also include the fraction 
of time, since entering the labour force for the first time, spent on sick or subsidised 
unemployment leave. All these variables are expected to identify whether or not 
individuals with poor careers are pushed into self-employment. 
In equation 1, we also include a common time effect (νt+1), an individual-specific 
time-invariant effect (μi) and an idiosyncratic shock (εit+1). We control for individual-
specific effects by demeaning. 
As is typical in these kinds of studies, we are unable to disentangle age, time and 
cohort effects. While we estimate a flexible specification including both year and age 
dummies, we do not attempt to interpret them attributing trends to either component. 
As our final sample numbers approximately 9.3 million observations, we are also 
able to estimate the age-specific response of the probability of self-employment to public 
pension wealth by interacting expected SSW with age dummies.  
 
                                                 
5 In addition, to account for short run macroeconomic effects, i.e. the effect of the business cycle, 
we experimented with including in the model the cycle component of (log of) GDP per capita at regional 
level. This variable shows a non-negligible variation in the analysed period. However, it was found that the 
magnitude of the effect of that variable on the analysed outcomes was very small and we decided to exclude 
it from our models.   
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5. Data 
We use a sample of administrative data drawn from the archive of the main Italian 
Social Security scheme (National Institute of Social Security, Istituto Nazionale di 
Previdenza Sociale, INPS)6. 
The INPS archive officially records the complete earnings and contribution 
histories of all participants, i.e. employees in the private sector and some categories of 
the self-employed (craftsmen, tradesmen and farmers). Other categories of self-employed 
workers, and, in particular, professional workers, have their own independent pension 
funds and are not covered by INPS; hence we have no information on those professional 
workers. The available sample is formed by all individuals born on the first and the ninth 
of each month of any year — so that the theoretical sample frequency is 24:365 — and 
reports employment spells until 2012. The archive contains very rich information about 
the earnings histories of the workers, recording spells of unemployment and sickness, as 
well as labour income earned each year. 
As is typical with administrative data, the demographic information is, on the 
other hand, less rich: The sample records the gender, date and region of birth and region 
of residence in 2012 for each worker. No information about the family status or education 
level of the worker is available. 
We clean our sample in the following way. We start by restricting our attention to 
the period 1985-2005, as we are interested in studying the effect of reforms to the pension 
system that occurred during the nineties7. We also select male individuals born between 
1940 and 1980, as well as workers aged between 25 and 598. We also disregard 
individuals whose information on region of birth is missing, as well as individuals born 
in a foreign region, for which different pension rules apply9.  
We transform the data into yearly spells by adding up, for each year, the number 
of weeks worked and the income earned. If an individual contributed to both wage- and 
self-employment schemes in the same year, we define the main scheme as the one in 
which the majority of time was spent (measured in weeks of work). We keep year 
observations in which the worker is active for at least 12 weeks. Other cut-points produce 
more or less similar results. 
                                                 
6 The file LoSai (Longitudinal Sample Inps) is available on the Italian Ministry of Labour website 
(http://www.cliclavoro.gov.it/Barometro-Del-Lavoro/Pagine/Microdati-per-la-ricerca.aspx). 
7 However, to compute the expected pension and other measures used in the analysis, we use all 
information available including all years prior to 1985. 
8 Self-employment choices of women belonging to the analysed cohorts are likely to have different 
dynamics to those of males. In particular, women experienced a great secular increase in labour market 
participation and wages in the analysed period. Including individuals younger than 25 may raise issues of 
sample selection bias related to education choices.   
9 We do not observe the foreign region of birth in question. 
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After these selections and transformations we are left with a sample of 10.4 
million person-year observations, pertaining to workers contributing to five main 
schemes: employees, the self-employed, agricultural workers, flexible workers and a 
remaining group which includes minor schemes such as clergymen or rail workers (which 
we label “other”). 
In table 1 we report the transition probabilities for these workers. The table 
highlights that employees and the self-employed together account for more than 90 per 
cent of the workers covered by INPS. In general, all categories of workers tend to remain 
in their scheme, with 97.5 (95.8) per cent of employees (self-employed) in one period 
remaining in wage(self)-employment in the next. Flexible workers are an exception, as 
they are typically (but not solely) younger workers who enter the job market with a 
flexible contract. As this type of contract was only introduced in Italy in 1995, we do not 
include these workers in our analysis. 
 
Table 1 – Transition probabilities between categories of workers – yearly data  
 Employee Self-employed Agriculture Flexible Other Total 
Employee 97.51 1.46 0.13 0.69 0.21 100 
Self-employed 2.9 95.84 0.06 1.17 0.03 100 
Agriculture 2.83 0.54 96.04 0.58 0.02 100 
Flexible 12.43 8.42 0.61 77.94 0.59 100 
Other 4.3 0.24 0.01 0.88 94.57 100 
Total  69.26 21.82 3.05 2.53 3.34 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INPS data set. 
 
We then restrict our analysis to employees and self-employed workers, who are 
the focus of this paper. The self-employment rate, defined as the ratio of self-employed 
workers to the total, which, in our sample, is given by employees plus the self-employed, 
is rather stable over time at around 24-25 per cent, as can be seen from Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 –Self-employment rate 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INPS data set. 
 
We then group observations according to year of birth, and form four ten-year 
year-of-birth groups, born between 1940 and 1980. The time evolution of the self-
employment rate for the resulting four generations (or cohorts) is shown in Figure 2, 
where, in the x-axis, we report the calendar year to highlight the time effects. For example, 
in 1985 the self-employment rate of all workers born between 1940 and 1949 (named 
cohort 1945 in the graph) amounted to 29%. In the same year, the self-employment rate 
for individuals born between 1950 and 1959 (hence aged between 26 and 35 in 1985) 
amounted to 23%. Each line in the graph then shows the self-employment rate of each 
generation as it ages. The younger generation (born between 1970 and 1980) enters the 
graph in 1995 as we disregarded individuals younger than 25 from our sample. 
Figure 2 shows that the self-employment rate for each cohort slightly increases 
with age until age 40 – for example, for the 1965 generation, the self-employment rate 
increases from 20 to 25% between ages 20 and 40 (i.e. in the 1985-2005 period). For the 
eldest cohort, born in 1945, the Figure reveals an increase in the self-employment rate 
after 1995, when the cohort is aged between 45 and 55: this is a result of the fact that 
many employees start retiring after reaching age 55 while, typically, self-employed 
workers retire at older ages.  
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Figure 2 – Self-employment rate, by cohort 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INPS data set. 
 
As we follow the same individuals over time, we are also able to study transitions 
between employment and self-employment. In table 2, we report the overall transition 
probabilities for these two groups of workers. As the total number of observations is about 
9.3 million, despite the transition from employee to self-employed only occurring with 
probability of 1.5 per cent, we are able to observe it more than 100,000 times. Self-
employed workers, on the other hand, display a higher probability of switching to the 
employee scheme, of approximately 2.8 per cent (about 66,000 transitions). 
Table 2 - Transition probabilities between employees and the self-employed 
 Employee Self-employed Total 
Employee 98.53 1.47 100 
Self-employed 2.84 97.16 100 
Total  75.13 24.87 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INPS data set. 
 
In Figures 3 and 4 below, we show the transitions over time and by cohort. For 
transitions from employment to self-employment, shown in Figure 3, we select 
individuals who start their career as employees and follow them until they switch to self-
employment (or until the end of the sample if they do not switch). Figure 3 highlights that 
there are strong cohort effects in the transition rate from employment to self-employment, 
with younger cohorts being more likely to switch. The age effects are also clearly 
negative, with younger individuals being more likely to switch from employment to self-
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employment. Common macro shocks are also evident in the figure, such as the spike in 
the year 1997, a year in which an important reform introducing more flexibility in the 
labour market was implemented. 
 
Figure 3 – Transition rate from employment to self-employment, by cohort 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INPS data set. 
 
Similarly, we study transitions from self-employment to employment, selecting 
individuals who start their career as self-employed and following them until they switch 
to employment (or until the end of the sample if they do not switch). These transitions are 
more likely than the previous ones, as already noted in Table 2. Cohort effects are evident 
in Figure 4, with younger cohorts being more likely to switch. Common time trends can 
also be spotted: in particular, after 1993 the trend is quite flat for all the cohorts 
considered. 
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Figure 4 – Transition rate from self-employment to employment, by cohort 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on INPS data set. 
 
6. Results: estimating SSW 
For each selected individual and in each period, we compute his expected Social 
Security Wealth (SSW) in the two alternative hypotheses of a continuous career, from 
that point onwards, as an employee or as a self-employed worker, assuming the worker 
would retire at the legal retirement age applied in each regime. SSW is defined as the 
present value of benefits expected by the worker minus payroll tax which has to be paid 
from time t+1 onwards. We obtain for each time t+1 the relevant quantities in the two 
alternative scenarios of working as an employee from time t+1 to retirement age and of 
working as a self-employed worker from time t+1 to (self-employed) retirement age, 
taking the past career as given and fixed. In both scenarios, workers (potentially) have 
mixed careers, as in the past (up to time t) they may have had spells of employment as 
well as self-employment.  
To obtain the desired quantities, we proceed as follows. We assume the income 
stream is the same in both scenarios, of employment and self-employment. In this way, 
variation in SSW depends on the public pension rules and not on our hypotheses about 
the future evolution of income. In addition, we assume the income stream is given by its 
actual realisation until time t+1, and it is projected to be constant in real terms from that 
point onwards, until the worker retires at the legal age required by the legislation in force 
at time t+1. While other hypotheses about the future income stream are certainly possible, 
we prefer not to introduce a more complicated structure, which may be difficult to 
interpret. In addition, it should be noted that we are interested in computing the difference 
in SSW when choosing self-employment or employment, and not its level. 
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Computing the pension benefit and SSW in the case of mixed careers is a complex 
exercise and we simplify the calculation using a two-step procedure. Using the income 
stream, constant across scenarios, we start computing the expected pension benefits and 
contributions paid over the rest of the working life assuming, alternatively, that the 
individual has been an employee or a self-employed person for all his working life, using 
the current (at time t+1) pension legislation. We then approximate the pension benefits in 
the case of mixed careers according to the actual rules applying in each case. For the 
scenario of a career as an employee from time t+1 onwards, we take a weighted average 
of the pension benefits in the self-employment and the employment continuous scenarios, 
using the number of years in each occupation as weights. For the alternative scenario of 
a career in self-employment from time t+1 onwards, the pension benefit is the same as a 
continuous career in self-employment. 
More in detail, for each individual and at each point in time, we compute two 
estimates of the old-age pension benefits earned at the end of the career, one assuming a 
full wage employee (WE) career, and the other assuming a full self-employed (SE) career. 
We compute the Present Value (PV) at time t+1 of the discounted sum of the pension 
benefits received since retirement age until death, and call it 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐)  and 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐) respectively.10 Similarly, we compute the PV of the contributions to be paid 
from time t+1 until retirement in each employment scenario, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆) and 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆).11 What we need for our estimates are the expected SSWs computed on the 
basis of the actual career until time t+1, and of a projected career of (continuous) wage or 
self-employment from time t+1 onwards.  
According to Italian legislation, a worker could switch from employment to self-
employment at no cost, as the amount of contributions paid was higher in the former case. 
Hence the expected SSW when continuously being self-employed or when switching to 
self-employment is the same:  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐) − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)    (2) 
Where 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆  is SSW computed at time t+1 in the case of a mixed career, while 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐 is SSW in the case of a full SE career.  
When computing the opposite case, that of a worker in wage-employment from 
time t+1 onwards, we need to consider that for workers switching from self-employment 
to employment the transition was (and still is) costly. We approximate the expected SSW 
in this case as the weighted average of the PV of the pension benefits based on the 
                                                 
10 WE_c indicates a complete career as wage-employed while SE_c indicates a complete career as 
self-employed. The discount factor used to compute the PV includes the survival probability and a real 
discount rate equal to 1.5%. 
11 For comparability with the self-employment case, for employees we consider the total amount 
of contributions, paid by the worker and by the employer, from time t+1 onwards. 
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continuous careers, using as weights the number of periods spent in each occupation, 
minus the PV of the contributions still to be paid: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1
𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 = 𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝑃𝑃𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐) + 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐)− 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖+1(𝐶𝐶𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆)  (3) 
Where Nwe is the number of years a worker spent contributing to the employee 
scheme throughout his working life, Nse is the number of years spent contributing to the 
self-employed scheme, and NTOTwe is the total number of years spent in the labour market 
when retiring as a wage employee. The career length is individual-specific as we observe 
the entrance into the labour market for each individual. Formula (3) applies with the 
condition of accruing at least 15 years of contributions in each scheme. If a worker 
accrues less than 15 years in a scheme, which was the minimum seniority required to 
claim a retirement benefit in the years considered in our study, he is not entitled to obtain 
a benefit in that scheme and his pension will only be constituted by the benefit accrued in 
the other scheme12. 
For illustrative purposes, in Figures 5 and 6 we show the average SSW in the 
continuous scenarios ((𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1
𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐  and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝑐𝑐), i.e. assuming continuous careers either 
as employed or as self-employed, by ten years-of-birth generations (from 1940 to 1980). 
As occurred previously, the variable of interest is plotted with the calendar year on the x-
axis, in order to highlight the macro shocks induced by the reforms. When all other 
aspects are equal, SSW is lower for younger individuals whose distance from retirement 
age is greater (as contributions have to be paid for a longer period; in addition, there is a 
discounting effect). Starting with SSW where an individual remains an employee for his 
whole life, shown in Figure 5, the effects of the 1992 and 1995 reforms can clearly be 
seen for each cohort: younger cohorts start with a lower SSW both because in any year 
they are younger and because the payroll tax rate increased quite steadily over time, well 
before the nineties. Our results on the effect of the reforms are in line with those found, 
for example, by Borella and Coda Moscarola (2006, 2011). 
The SSW where an individual is always self-employed is shown in Figure 6. Self-
employed workers before 1990 paid lower (although increasing over time) payroll tax 
rates and received, on average, lower benefits, computed with a DC mechanism. Their 
expected SSW is consequently lower than that of employees until the reform of 1990. 
That reform, increasing both the contributions and benefits for the self-employed, resulted 
in an increase in their SSW starting from the years 1990-91. Subsequently, the self-
employed were also hit by the reforms in 1992 and 1995, which had the effect of reducing 
their expected SSW, although to a lesser extent than employees.  
                                                 
12 In other words, we are assuming that it is not possible to reunite contributions and seniority, as 
in reality this was (and still is) extremely expensive. 
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Figure 5 – Average Social Security Wealth in the case of a career in wage-employment 
  
Note: values expressed in 2013 Euro. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 6 – Average Social Security Wealth in the case of a career in self-employment 
 
Note: values expressed in 2013 Euro. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Our main variable of interest is not SSW itself but, rather, the difference in SSW 
deriving from opting to be in self-employment or employment from time t+1 onwards, 
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given the career undertaken until that time: 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) in terms of 
equation (1). The evolution of this variable by cohort and over time is shown in Figure 7. 
The Figure shows that this difference varies greatly across generations and over time. For 
example, for workers born in 1945 the average difference moves from around -40,000 
Euro in 1985 to almost 60,000 Euro in the year 2000. The difference, on average, was 
negative until 1990, i.e. until the first reform that increased the SSW for the self-
employed, and positive thereafter, indicating that after the reforms of the 1990s the self-
employed have a higher SSW than employees. In addition, after the year 2000, the 
difference diminishes for all cohorts and the variation across cohorts also vanishes, a 
result of the (slow) harmonisation process introduced by the reforms. 
Figure 7 – Average difference in SSW in the case of self-employment or employment, by 
cohort 
 
Note: values expressed in 2013 Euro. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
7. Results: self-employment status 
We estimate the effect of SSW on the probability of an individual being self-
employed rather than wage-employed for individuals who were either self-employed or 
wage employed between 1985 and 2005. In all our specifications we include the 
difference between the expected SSW for the case where the worker decides to be self-
employed for the rest of his working life and the expected SSW for the case where he 
chooses to be an employee from the current period onwards until retirement. As discussed 
earlier, we estimate expected SSW using the rules in force at t+1 and income for the same 
period, as well as expected SSW using t+1 rules and income in period t. We use this 
second couple of variables (in the case of self-employment and wage-employment) to 
form an instrument to be used in our main specification and we also estimate the reduced 
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form using the instrument directly as a regressor. The three specifications are shown in 
table 3, columns 1 to 3.  
In the first column we find that the overall coefficient for the difference in SSW 
t+1 (yt+1) where an individual chooses self-employment versus wage-employment amounts 
to 0.42, with a standard error of 0.004, hence statistically different from zero at any 
standard significance level. As our sample consists of about 9.3 million person-year 
observations, estimating very low standard errors – or, in other words, estimating 
coefficients with small confidence intervals – is unsurprising. What is important in this 
context is the size of the effect, as we are, in principle, able to estimate precisely effects 
that are close to zero. As our SSW variables are expressed in millions, our finding implies 
that, other things being equal, a 10,000 Euro increase in the difference in SSW increases 
the probability of being in self-employment by about 0.42 percentage points. The average 
increase in the difference in SSW both between 1989 and 1990 and between 1995 and 
1996 was approximately 30,000 Euro in each case. Assuming that these differences are 
due entirely to the change in Social Security rules, our estimate implies that the effect of 
these two reforms on the probability of being in self-employment was of 1.26 percentage 
points. The 1992 reform had, on average, a lesser effect on the difference in expected 
SSW, of about 20,000 Euros, implying an increase in the probability of being in self-
employment of about 0.84 percentage points. 
As a measure of the overall performance in the labour market, we also include the 
present value of income, computed assuming real income is a random walk, hence its 
predicted value from time t+1 to retirement is equal to real income at time t. The income 
stream is assumed to be the same under the two scenarios of self-employment and wage-
employment. We find a small, negative effect of this variable: a 10,000 Euro increase in 
the PV of income reduces the probability of being self-employed by 0.1 percentage points. 
In addition, we find that labour market experience, measured in years, increases the 
probability of being self-employed by about 0.7 percentage points for every additional 
year. Individuals who have been in the labour market for longer are more likely to have 
switched to self-employment, as already found, for example, by Evans and Leighton 
(1989). 
We also find that the fraction of time spent out of the labour force increases the 
probability of being self-employed, indicating that individuals with poor career prospects 
may be pushed into self-employment. Conversely, the fraction of time spent in sick or 
subsidised unemployment leave – two benefits typically (but not solely) received by 
wage-employed workers – reduces the probability of being self-employed, indicating that 
workers who are protected are less likely to be self-employed. 
In column 2 we estimate the same specification with an FE-2SLS estimator, using 
as instrument the difference in expected SSW in the case of self-employment and wage-
employment computed on an expected income stream based on past income up to time t. 
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The coefficient estimated from the first stage is reported in the bottom part of the table 
and amounts to 0.72, indicating that our instrument indeed helps to explain the difference 
in SSW. This estimate confirms the results shown in column 1, with the absolute values 
of the coefficients on the difference in expected SSW higher than the one found in the 
first column, as a 10,000 Euro increase in the difference raises the probability of being 
self-employed by about 0.7 percentage points. 
Finally, in the third column we report the reduced form estimates, with the 
expected SSW in the case of self-employment and wage-employment computed on an 
expected income stream based upon past income up to time t included as regressors. The 
results indicate that with a 10,000 Euro increase in the difference, this raises the 
probability of being self-employed by 0.5 percentage points. 
 
Table 3 – The effect of the difference in SSW on the self-employment rate 
 FE FE-2SLS FE-RF 
 b/se b/se b/se 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) 0.4181*** 0.6953***  
 (0.0036) (0.0026)  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)   0.5119*** 
   (0.0041) 
PV(Y)t -0.0991*** -0.1111*** -0.0969*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
Experience 0.0068*** 0.0052*** 0.0067*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) 
Out of work 0.0077** 0.0166*** 0.0190*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0014) (0.0038) 
Sick or unemployed -0.1549*** -0.1524*** -0.1557*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0016) (0.0028) 
Constant 0.2268*** 0.2545*** 0.2241*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0009) (0.0027) 
First stage:    
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)  0.7192***  
  (0.0003)  
Number of observations 9,288,651 9,288,651 9,288,651 
R-squared within 0.025 0.022 0.026 
Notes: the dependent variable is equal to 0 in the case of employment and to 1 in the case of self-
employment. FE: fixed-effects estimate. FE-2SLS: fixed-effects two-stage least-squares estimate. FE-RF: 
fixed effects reduced form estimate. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time and age dummies. The SSW variables and the PV of income are all expressed in millions at 2013 
prices. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Finally, we relax the assumption that the effect of the difference in SSW is 
constant over age and estimate a fully flexible model where the difference in SSW is 
interacted with age dummies. Thanks to the very large sample size at our disposal, the 
parameters are very precisely estimated (the results are available upon request). Figure 7 
reports the resulting average marginal effects (including 95 per cent confidence intervals) 
by age for the difference in SSWt+1 (yt), estimated using the reduced form specification 
to avoid endogeneity issues13.  
The effect of the difference in SSW on the probability of being self-employed 
decreases with age up to age 45, and increases again at older ages. As the difference in 
SSW is measured in millions, the findings shown in figure 4 indicate, for instance, that a 
10,000 Euro increase in the difference in SSW determines an increase in the probability 
of being self-employed of about 1 percentage point at age 27 and of 0.4 percentage points 
at age 45.  
 
                                                 
13 In addition, with respect to the 2SLS-FE estimates, we keep the computing time at a reasonable 
level. 
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Figure 7 – Average marginal effect of the difference in SSW, by age, on the self-
employment rate. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
8. Results: transitions to self-employment 
In table 4 we show the estimates of the probability of switching to self-
employment. To obtain these estimates, we select wage-employed individuals and include 
them in the sample until they switch to self-employment. If they do switch, subsequent 
observations are disregarded from the sample. 
Also in this case we estimate three specifications: our basic fixed-effect 
specification, an FE-2SLS specification to account for endogeneity in expected SSW, and 
the reduced form. 
The results, consistent with our previous estimates of the self-employment rate, 
indicate that an increase in the difference in expected SSW increases the probability of 
switching to self-employment from wage-employment. The estimate of this effect is equal 
to about 0.15 percentage points every 10,000 additional Euros in the difference in SSW 
for specification 1, again to about 0.15 percentage points in the FE-2SLS estimates, and 
finally to 0.1 percentage points in the reduced form reported in column 3. As the 
probability of switching is very low (as shown in section 5) and equal to 1.3% on average, 
the effect of the difference in expected SSW is quite sizeable even in the latter estimate. 
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1995 and 1996 was of about 30,000 Euro, while between 1992 and 1993 the average 
increase was of about 20,000. Our 2SLS-FE estimate implies that the effect of the 1990 
and 1995 reforms on the probability of switching to self-employment were of 0.45 
percentage points after the 1990 and 1995 reforms and of almost 0.30 percentage points 
after the 1992 reform. 
The present value of the income stream has a negative effect on the probability of 
switching; indicating a 100,000 Euro increase in this variable reduces the probability of 
entering self-employment by 0.6 percentage points – a result that provides some evidence 
in favour of the ‘push’ hypothesis.  
Experience in this case measures the number of years spent in the labour market 
as wage-employed and it has a negative effect on the probability of switching: ten 
additional years spent in the labour market as an employee reduce the probability of 
switching by 1 per cent. The fraction of time spent out of the INPS archive has a positive 
impact on the probability of switching, while the fraction of time spent in sick or 
subsidised unemployment has a negative effect, consistently with what we found for the 
self-employment rate in the previous section. 
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Table 4 – The effect of the difference in SSW on the transition rate from WE to SE 
 FE 2SLS-FE RF-FE 
 b/se b/se b/se 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) 0.1465*** 0.1460***  
 (0.0020) (0.0021)  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)   0.0961*** 
   (0.0020) 
PV(Y)t -0.0600*** -0.0600*** -0.0563*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Experience -0.0107*** -0.0107*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Out of work 0.0251*** 0.0252*** 0.0349*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0016) 
Sick or unemployed -0.0217*** -0.0217*** -0.0241*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Constant 0.0640*** 0.0640*** 0.0544*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0014) 
First stage:    
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)  0.6582***  
  (0.0004)  
Number of observations 6,617,088 6,617,088 6617088 
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.034 
Notes: the dependent variable is equal to 0 in the case of employment and to 1 in the case of self-
employment. FE: fixed-effects estimate. FE-2SLS: fixed-effects two-stage least-squares estimate. FE-RF: 
fixed effects reduced form estimate. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time and age dummies. The SSW variables and the PV of income are all expressed in millions at 2013 
prices. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
In Figure 8 we show how the effect of the difference in SSW varies with age. The 
effect is not constant over the age range but it is higher at younger ages, reaching a 
minimum at 40, and then increasing again thereafter. After that age, the difference in 
expected SSW is found to play an increasingly important role. After age 55 the sample 
size reduces, as some employees retire from the labour market, and the standard errors 
are higher. 
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Figure 8 – Average marginal effect of the difference in SSW, by age, on transitions from 
employment to self-employment. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
9. Results: transitions to employment 
As we have a large sample, we are also able to provide evidence on the probability 
of self-employment workers switching to wage-employment. To this end, we use the 
same variables and specifications used in the previous sections but this time we define 
the dependent variable to be equal to 0 when a worker is self-employed, and equal to 1 
when he switches to wage-employment. Paralleling the analysis of the previous section, 
we disregard all observations following the (possible) switch. The results reported in 
Table 5 show that the effect of the difference in SSW on the probability of switching is 
quite sizeable: the results from the 2SLS-FE specification reported in the second column 
imply that a 10,000 Euro increase in the difference in SSW reduces the probability of 
switching to wage-employment by 0.2 percentage points, while the results from the 
reduced form in column 3 imply a reduction in the same probability by 0.14 percentage 
points. The effect of the reforms, implied by our 2SLS-FE estimates and computed as in 
the previous sections, leads to a reduction in the transition rate of about 0.6 percentage 
points after the 1990 and 1995 reforms, and of about 0.4 percentage points after the 1992 
reform (where the overall transition rate is 2.8%).  
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Also in this case, the present value of income has a negative coefficient, indicating 
that, conditional upon being a self-employed worker, having a higher income reduces the 
probability of switching. In other words, successful workers tend not to change job. 
Experience, measured as years spent as a self-employed worker, also has a negative 
effect, while experiencing a high fraction of time out of work increases the probability of 
switching. Self-employed workers who paid contributions while off sick are much more 
likely to switch to employment.  
 
 
Table 5 – The effect of the difference in SSW on the transition rate from SE to WE 
 FE 2SLS-FE RF-FE 
 b/se b/se b/se 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) -0.0935*** -0.1984***  
 (0.0037) (0.0050)  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)   -0.1353*** 
   (0.0041) 
PV(Y)t -0.0389*** -0.0333*** -0.0387*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0009) 
Experience -0.0334*** -0.0335*** -0.0334*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Out of work 0.0874*** 0.0916*** 0.0849*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0025) (0.0046) 
Sick or unemployed 0.2639*** 0.2593*** 0.2637*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0092) (0.0170) 
Constant 0.0777*** 0.0794*** 0.0797*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0015) (0.0034) 
First stage:    
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)  0.6820***  
  (0.0007)  
Number of observations 1,782,640 1,782,640 1,782,640 
R-squared 0.071 0.070 0.071 
Notes: the dependent variable is equal to 1 in the case of employment and to 0 in the case of self-
employment. FE: fixed-effects estimate. FE-2SLS: fixed-effects two-stage least-squares estimate. FE-RF: 
fixed effects reduced form estimate. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include 
time and age dummies. The SSW variables and the PV of income are all expressed in millions at 2013 
prices. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Looking at the effect over age ranges, we find a different dynamic, with workers 
switching from self-employment to employment mostly responsive to the difference in 
expected SSW at younger ages. While the effect diminishes after age 35, it is still 
quantitatively very important until age 58. For example, at age 35 a 10,000 Euro increase 
in the difference in SSW reduces the probability of switching by about 0.2 percentage 
points, while the same amount at age 46 reduces the probability by 0.1 percentage points.  
 
Figure 9 – Average marginal effect of the difference in SSW, by age, on transitions from 
self-employment to employment. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
10. Conclusions 
In this work we study the effect of Social Security Wealth in explaining the 
individual probability of being in self-employment rather than in employment as well as 
the probability of switching from self-employment to employment and vice versa.  We 
base our analysis on a large panel of administrative data drawn from the archive of the 
main Italian Social Security scheme (National Institute of Social Security, Istituto 
Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, INPS). We use the large exogenous variation in 
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individual Social Security Wealth occurring as a result of the reform process undertaken 
in Italy during the 1990s to identify its effect on the probability of being self-employed. 
We concentrate our analysis on the two main categories of self-employed workers – 
craftsmen and shopkeepers – which share the same Social Security rules and can be 
treated as one single category.  
Our empirical strategy is as follows: we compute the expected Social Security 
Wealth for each individual and at each point in time in the two alternative scenarios of 
self- and wage-employment, and estimate the effect of the difference in expected SSW 
on the self-employment rate and on the switching probabilities. We estimate a linear 
probability model estimated also controlling for other observable determinants and 
unobserved heterogeneity. Overall, we find that the difference in expected SSW in the 
two scenarios has an important role in explaining the observed patterns. 
In particular, when looking at the self-employment rate, we find that, other things 
being equal, a 10,000 Euro increase in the difference in expected SSW in the two 
scenarios increases the probability of being in self-employment by between 0.4 and 0.7 
percentage points, depending on the specification. The effect of the difference in SSW on 
the probability of being a self-employed worker is not independent of age: our estimates 
show that its effect is highest for young individuals, decreasing for middle-aged workers, 
and increasing again after age 50. 
We also estimate the probability of switching to self-employment from 
employment and vice versa. The results indicate that an increase in the difference in 
expected SSW in the scenarios of self-employment and employment increases the 
probability of switching to self-employment from employment, while it reduces the 
probability of switching to employment from self-employment. 
With regard to transitions from employment to self-employment, we find that the 
effect of the difference in expected SSW is quite sizeable, given that the average 
probability of switching is very low and equal to 1.3%. The average increase in the 
difference in SSW after the 1990 and 1995 reforms was about 30,000 Euro while, after 
the 1992 reform, the difference in SSW increased by about 20,000 Euro. Assuming that 
these differences are entirely due to the change in Social Security rules, our estimates 
imply that the effect of these on the probability of switching to self-employment was of 
almost 0.45 percentage points after the 1990 and 1995 reforms, and almost 0.3 percentage 
points after the 1992 reform. 
Transitions from self-employment to employment are more likely to occur, with 
an average transition rate equal to 2.8%. The effect of the reforms, implied by our 2SLS-
FE estimates, is a reduction in the transition rate of about 0.6 percentage points after the 
1990 and 1995 reforms, and about 0.4 percentage points after the 1992 reform. 
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APPENDIX 
As we perform our analysis using administrative data from the INPS archive, we 
are interested to know if the fraction of Italian workers covered by INPS is stable over 
time. In the graph below, we show the percentage of workers covered by the INPS archive 
over the total number of workers (source: Eurostat) from 1983 to 2012. This demonstrates 
that the proportion of workers who we follow over time is roughly constant, at around 
55% of the total workers. 
Figure A1 – Fraction of workers covered by INPS 
 
Note: In this graph we show the ratio (expressed as a percentage) of workers covered by the INPS 
archive and the total number of workers (aged 15+) as recorded by Eurostat. 
 
The Evolution of the Italian pension system 
While the Pension Fund for Private Employees dates back to the beginning of the 
19th century, it was respectively in 1959 and in 1966 that craftsmen and shopkeepers 
began to be covered by Social Security: self-employed workers then became eligible to 
receive retirement benefits. As a transitory measure, workers were able to apply for 
pensions with only 1 year of contributions. The payroll contributions for the self-
employed were especially low, set at 12% of a minimum figurative income until 1973, 
when they were slightly raised. In 1982, an additional 4% computed on actual taxable 
income was added. The accrued pension benefit, computed with a defined contribution 
approach, was consequently very low and in most cases it was subsidised to reach the 
guaranteed minimum pension. In the same years, private employees contributed with a 
total payroll tax rate of about 20-25 per cent, which then increased over time as 
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imbalances of the public pension system became apparent14. Their pension benefit was 
computed with a defined benefit formula and they could, in general, retire earlier than 
self-employed workers. 
An important reform in 1990 profoundly modified the rules, only for self-
employed workers, increasing the contributions paid into the system and transforming 
benefits, introducing a defined benefit pension formula similar to that applied to 
employees.  
Hence, immediately after the 1990 reform, the pension system was characterised, 
for all workers, by a defined benefit pension formula, based upon the last few years of 
earnings or income, without any actuarial correction for age at retirement.  
In the main scheme, the Pension Fund for Private Employees (FPLD), the pension 
was based upon pensionable earnings – computed as the average of the last five years’ 
earnings - multiplied by the number of working years and by the annual accrual rate:  
∑
=
+−=
5
1
1 5/**
i
iaDB wNP γ    (A1) 
where a  is the individual’s age in his final working year, w is his gross annual 
earnings indexed for inflation, γ is the annual accrual rate (approximately equal to 2 per 
cent) and N is the number of years the individual has been active in the labour market. 
For self-employed workers a similar formula applied, with the average income computed 
over the last ten years of activity.  
An important difference between the self-employed and employees was 
constituted in the old-age requirement, being 65 for the former and 60 for the latter group. 
The reform that took place in 1992, whilst preserving the defined benefit system, 
modified the pension benefit formula for both employees and self-employed workers. For 
younger workers, pensionable earnings (or income) were planned to be based on the 
worker’s entire earnings history and re-valued at the nominal GDP growth rate. For older 
workers, a transition phase gradually increasing the period over which pensionable 
earnings were to be computed was started. Most importantly, the pension indexation 
mechanism was downgraded from wages to prices for all categories of workers, with 
immediate effect, causing a sudden reduction in SSW for all workers (as well as 
pensioners). Such an indexation mechanism has since been maintained by all subsequent 
reforms. In addition, eligibility requirements for employees were gradually tightened.  
Another reform, approved in 1995, rescheduled a new (and lengthy) transition 
towards an NDC formula. When the new system is phased in, benefits will be 
                                                 
14 With “total payroll tax rate” we refer to the payroll tax rate paid both by the worker –
approximately one-third of the total - and by the employer. 
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commensurate to the amount of payroll taxes paid, capitalised at an interest rate equal to 
the growth rate of the GDP and annuitized according to life expectancy at retirement.  
The reforms of 1992 and 1995 thus opened a lengthy transition period which will 
end in 2030. Until then, in fact, the rules for accessing retirement and for calculating the 
pension benefit will evolve differently for different generations of workers. In particular, 
three groups can be distinguished: 
1 - workers who accumulated at least 18 years of service at the end of 1995: the 
pension for these workers is calculated with the DB rules as modified by the 1992 reform. 
The age requirements for retirement have also been raised. Hence a Modified Defined 
Benefit (MDB) applies to these workers; 15 
2 - workers who started contributing to the pension system before 1995 but 
accumulated less than 18 years of contributions at the end of 1995: for these workers the 
pension is calculated with a pro rata (PR) system. The first part of the pension covers the 
seniority accrued up to the end of 1995 and is calculated with the DB formula. The second 
part of the pension instead refers to seniority accrued after 1995 and is calculated with 
the NDC formula. 
3 - workers who entered the labour market since January 1, 1996: the NDC system 
fully applies to these workers. 
The above classification applies to both the self-employed and employees, 
although there are still differences in the computation of pensionable earnings, in the 
payroll tax rates and in legal retirement ages. 
It is useful to describe the above mentioned pension formulae for the computation 
of the benefits, as the results of our analysis are largely based upon them. In the MDB 
system, the benefit depends upon pensionable income, i.e. average income earned at the 
end of the career. As a consequence of the 1992 reform, the benefit consists of two parts, 
in which pensionable income is computed taking the average over a longer period for 
seniority accrued after 1992. Apart from this complication, the MDB check is a traditional 
defined benefit pension computed as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛼𝛼 ∗ (𝑐𝑐1𝑆𝑆1 + 𝑐𝑐2𝑆𝑆2)         (A2) 
Where W1 and W2 is pensionable income, i.e. average income over the last five 
(W1) or ten (W2) years of the working career (ten to fifteen for the self-employed), re-
valued in line with inflation (W1) or nominal GDP growth (W2), and c1 and c2 are the 
years of contribution accrued before and after 1992 respectively. The annual accrual rate 
                                                 
15 A further reform in 2011 modified the rules for this group of workers, adding a pro-rata 
component to their pension benefit starting from 2012. As our analysis stops before 2011, we do not discuss 
this reform in detail. See Borella and Coda Moscarola (2015) for an analysis of the 2011 reform. 
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α is equal to 2 per cent up to a certain threshold, gradually reduced for higher pensionable 
incomes. 
The NDC pension, for all categories of workers, is computed as: 
( ) 11* +
=
− ⋅





+= ∑ a
a
ai
ia
iNDC gCP δ   (A3)  
where Ci is the contribution paid by the worker at age i, g is the five years moving 
average of the nominal GDP growth rate, δ is an age-specific annuity rate, a  is the age 
at which the worker entered the labour market and a  is the individual’s age in his final 
working year. In other words, the pension benefit in the NDC system is equal to the 
notional capital, i.e. the sum of all contributions paid, re-valued to a rate equal to the five 
years moving average of the nominal GDP growth rate, multiplied by an age-specific 
coefficient δ. The annuity rates δ are set by law as the inverse of the present value at 
retirement of a one unit annuity benefit and they are updated according to life expectancy. 
The NDC pension formula fully applies to NDC workers, who entered the labour force 
after 1/1/1996. During the transition, i.e. for workers already active in the labour force in 
1995, the pension benefit will be computed with a pro rata mechanism, as a weighted 
average of the MDB and NDC check, with the weights given by years of seniority accrued 
before and after 1/1/1996. 
Due to the length of the transition, numerous legislative measures have gradually 
raised the requirements for access to retirement, but without changing the method of 
calculating the pension. 
Payroll tax rates have also been raised by the various reforms, reaching 32.7 per 
cent for employees and 17.2 per cent for the self-employed in the year 2005, the last year 
considered in our analysis. 
 
Hypotheses in the computation of the Present Values and expected SSW 
To compute future pension entitlements and expected SSW we use the official ISTAT 
mortality tables from 1985 to 2005. As for the macroeconomic variables, we set the 
interest rate, inflation rate and GDP real growth rate at their historical levels up to the 
year 2013. For the future they are set at 2 per cent, 1.6 per cent and 1.5 per cent, 
respectively. The real discount rate is also set at 1.5 per cent. 
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Summary statistics for regression variables 
Table A1 – summary statistics for variables included in the regressions, pooled data 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
self 0.258 0.438 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖+1) 0.026 0.053 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖) 0.026 0.048 
PV(Y)t 0.827 0.401 
Experience 19.015 9.615 
Out of work 0.182 0.188 
Sick or unemployed 0.073 0.117 
Age 38.810 8.701 
Note: the number of observations is 9,288,651. These are summary statistics referring to the estimates 
shown in Table 3 in the main text. All monetary values are expressed in millions of Euro at 2013 prices. 
